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MANDATORY REVIEW

CASE # NLK- 88-68

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

DECLASSIFIED
October 26, 1962

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hillsman

Roger Hillsman

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: Moscow Seeks to Neutralize US Policy

Moscow's View of the Crisis. Moscow appears to

have concluded that a curtailment, at least for the time being, of the bulk of its arms shipments to Cuba, together with its stated willingness to accept the U Thant proposals, will serve to forestall further direct US action against Cuba. Further, Moscow probably believes that the US is now reluctant to risk an incident at sea.

Soviet Intentions. The Soviet purpose will be to

extend the period of US abstention from direct action, thereby keeping its missiles in place and permitting completion of their installation. In pursuing this goal, the Soviets are likely gradually to raise their demands on the US: a demand that the US cease reconnaissance activities over Cuba (and elsewhere) may well make an early appearance; and Moscow will be alert to exploit all proposals which seek to use the Cuban crisis to provide impetus to such schemes as denuclearized zones. Throughout, the Soviets will seek to maintain pressure on the US to call off the quarantine.

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Missiles in Cuba. Moscow evidently still has not decided whether to admit or unequivocally deny its missile deployment to Cuba. It is of course seeking to undermine the credibility of our evidence. It probably calculates that its present posture is an optimum one in that (1) the military threat represented by the missiles remains in place, while (2) the public Soviet position remains flexible.